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Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 and Utah
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3.
Issues Presented for Review
The UGA is dissatisfied with the statement of the issues of North Salt Lake.1 Two of
the major issues raised by North Salt Lake are: 1) whether the agreement between the parties
was ultra vires and unenforceable; and 2) whether North Salt Lake breached the agreement
because the time for its performance had not yet arrived. North Salt Lake takes the position
that these issues are legal issues and are reviewed for correctness without deference to the
decision of the trial court.
However, these issues are affirmative defenses to the breach of contract action
brought by the UGA. They address the liability of North Salt Lake under the agreement.
This liability was the subject of the UGA's motion for summary judgment filed on May, 4,
2000. The trial court issued a memorandum decision on July 14, 2000 determining that
North Salt Lake breached the contact between the parties.
North Salt Lake did not allege either of these affirmative defenses in its Answer and
neither were they raised during the summary judgment proceeding on liability. It chose to
wait for six months, until January 17,2001, to ask the court to reconsider its liability in light
of these arguments that were raised for the first time. North Salt Lake also filed a new
affidavit of the developer who originally conveyed the subject building lot with the deed

1

Both of the Appellants are jointly referred to herein as "North Salt Lake."
8

restrictions. North Salt Lake justified its delay in raising these affirmative defenses by
claiming that the developer's willingness to lift the deed restrictions was newly discovered
evidence. Yet, at the time North Salt Lake filed its motion for reconsideration and the
developer's affidavit, witness exhibit lists for trial had already been exchanged pursuant to
court order and the developer was not listed as a witness; the discovery cut-off was about to
pass; and the court would shortly hold a telephone pre-trial conference setting the trial date.
R. 237.
The trial court determined that North Salt Lake's motion for reconsideration should
not be granted based on the merits of its argument and also based upon the fact that North
Salt Lake had plenty of opportunity to raise these affirmative defenses six months earlier,
during the original summary judgment proceeding on liability and chose not to do so. R. 423
& 424. The court determined that motions for reconsideration, to the extent that they exist,
do not exist for the purpose of continually raising legal issues that should have been raised
in an original motion. R. 424.

The court's refusal to grant the motion for reconsideration

under these circumstances should be measured by the abuse of discretion standard, rather
than the de novo review standard proposed by North Salt Lake. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d
1381, 1386 & 87 (Utah 1996); and Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1312
(Utah 1994).
The UGA has crossed appealed the issue of whether the trial court erred in declining
to award its moving expenses incurred after it was evicted. The trial court determined that
the UGA did not mitigate its damages because it should have signed a 20 year lease extension

9

and then sued North Salt Lake for its failure to convey the building lot. R. 443. Whether the
duty to mitigate damages includes agreeing to the 20 year extension without the bargained
for building lot is a conclusion of law and was so identified by the trial court. R. 529. The
court found that but for the failure of North Salt Lake to convey the building lot, a 20 year
extension to the lease would have been successfully negotiated. This was a factual finding,
but the application of the doctrine of mitigation of damages to this finding was a conclusion
of law that is reviewed for correctness. Lysenko v. Sawaya. 7 P.3d 783, 787 (Utah 2000).
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules
The case is based upon common law doctrines and principals of contract. There are
no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or formal rules.
Statement of the Case
A.

Nature of the case.
This is a breach of contract action based upon the lease of office space to the UGA

by North Salt Lake at the City's Eaglewood golf course club house. As an inducement for
the UGA relocating its offices and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame to the club house and as an
inducement to entering into the lease, North Salt Lake agreed to convey fee title to the UGA
in an 18,975 square foot building lot that was just east of the club house parking lot, fronting
on a residential street next to the adjacent, developing subdivision. The initial term of the
lease was five years. In order to obtain the lot, the UGA had to sign a 20 year extension of
the lease.
As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties started negotiations for a long-
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term lease. During these negotiations, it became clear to the UGA that North Salt Lake did
not hold fee title to the building lot, but held title subject to significant use restrictions that
made it impossible to sell the lot to third parties. In addition, the lot was 17,768 square feet,
not the 18,975 square feet that North Salt Lake was obligated to convey. The UGA stood
ready to sign a 20 year lease but required the City to obtain release of the use restrictions and
stand ready to deed "fee title" in the 18,975 square foot building lot to the UGA. North Salt
Lake did not obtain release of the use restrictions on the lot and did not obtain the additional
1,207 square feet that it agreed to convey. The initial lease expired and the UGA became a
month-to-month tenant. Since the UGA would not enter into a new lease without fee title
in a lot of correct size, North Salt Lake terminated the tenancy of the UGA and evicted it
from the offices.
B.

Course of proceedings and disposition in the trial court.
The UGA sued North Salt Lake for breach of the lease. On May 4, 2000, the UGA

moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. On July 14,2000, the trial court ruled
that North Salt Lake breached the lease by not being able to transfer fee title in an 18,975
square foot building lot to the UGA. R. 220.
On November 9, 2000, the trial court issued a Notice of Telephone Conference that
listed cut-off dates. R. 237. These dates included an exchange of witness and exhibit lists
for trial by January 5, 2001, and a deposition cut-off of January 31, 2001. On January 17,
2001, North Salt Lake moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment granted by the
court six months earlier. The motion was based upon a new affidavit of the developer who
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conveyed the building lot to North Salt Lake with the use restrictions. The developer was
not listed as a witness on North Salt Lake's witness list. The UGA opposed the motion for
reconsideration and moved to strike the affidavit. On May 15, 2001, the court denied the
motion for reconsideration on the merits and also denied the motion because North Salt Lake
failed to raise the issues at the time of the original summary judgment on liability. R. 421.
Trial was held on May 30, 2001. R. 428. The court issued its findings of fact and
conclusions of law on August 10,2001 and judgment on November 14,2001. R. 525 & 549.
C.

Statement of facts.
1.

The UGA is an organization representing amateur golf in the state of Utah. R.

2.

North Salt Lake is a municipal corporation. R. 526.

3.

The Municipal Building Authority is a municipal building authority created by

526.

North Salt Lake. R. 526.
4.

North Salt Lake and the Municipal Building Authority constructed the

Eaglewood golf course and a club house. R. 526.
5.

On or about March 31, 1992, the parties entered into an agreement entitled

"Office Use Agreement," referred to herein as the "Agreement." R. 526.
6.

The Agreement included a "First Addendum to Office Use Agreement,"

referred to herein as the "First Addendum." R. 526.
7.

On or about January 3, 1994, the parties executed a "Second Addendum to

Office Use Agreement," referred to herein as the "Second Addendum." R. 526.
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8.

The parties agreed within the Agreement and the First Addendum that the UGA

would lease its offices at the club house from North Salt Lake for a term of five years, and
at the end of that term would enter into a 20 year lease at the base rent with a 3% cost of
living increase for each year. The Second Addendum changed the amount of rent, to an
amount agreed upon between the parties. R. 527, and Second Addendum, R. 34.
9.

As an inducement for the UGA relocating its offices and the Utah Golf Hall

of Fame to the club house; as an inducement to entering into the agreements; and as an
inducement to enter into a 20 year lease extension; North Salt Lake agreed to convey fee title
to the UGA in an 18,975 square foot building lot that was just east of the club house parking
lot, fronting on a residential street next to the adjacent, developing subdivision. R. 527.
10.

Unknown to the UGA and to North Salt Lake at the time of the Agreement and

the Addendums, neither of the defendants owned fee title to the building lot. Title was
conveyed to North Salt Lake in August of 1997, by Special Warranty Deed. The title
conveyed to North Salt Lake was not "fee title", as represented in the First and Second
Addendums. Rather, it contained significant restrictions to the use and transfer of the
property. In addition, the size of the lot was 1,207 square fee smaller than the size of the lot
that North Salt Lake was obligated to convey. R. 140, 157, 161 & 166.
11.

As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties started negotiations for

a 20 year extension of the lease. R. 527.
12.

During these negotiations, it became clear to the UGA that North Salt Lake did

not hold fee title to the building lot as represented in the First and Second Addendum, but

13

held title in a smaller lot, subject to significant use restrictions that made it impossible to sell
the lot to third parties and obtain the highest value for the lot. R. 527.
13.

The UGA desired to exercise its rights under the First Addendum and enter into

a 20 year extension of the lease. However, the UGA required the City to obtain release of
the use restrictions in the deed and stand ready to deed "fee title" in the building lot to the
UGA that could be marketable to third parties. R. 527.
14.

Between March, 1999 and December, 1999, the parties tried to resolve the

problem caused by the use restrictions on the lot. R. 527. Also, see letters exchanged
between the parties, trial exhibits 7-14.
15.

North Salt Lake did not obtain release of the use restrictions on the lot. R. 528.

16.

The initial term of the lease expired and the UGA became a month-to-month

tenant. R. 528.
17.

North Salt Lake was agreeable to entering into an extension of the lease and

continue to negotiate on the lot. The UGA required North Salt Lake to be able to convey the
lot free and clear from the use restrictions before entering into a new lease. R. 528. See UGA
letter of December 8, 1999, trial exhibit 13.
18.

But for the use restrictions on the lot, the parties would have successfully

negotiated a 20-year extension. R. 528.
19.

Since the UGA would not enter into an extension of the lease without fee title

in the lot, North Salt Lake terminated the month-to-month tenancy of the UGA and evicted
the UGA from its offices on December 31, 1999. R. 528.
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20.

The UGA complied with the eviction notice and vacated its offices at the

Eaglewood golf course. R. 528.
21.

The UGA incurred costs in moving its offices, salaries for employees involved

with the move, expenses associated with relocating its telephone system, costs of new
stationary with a new address, and miscellaneous expenses associated with the move,
primarily the cost of items that had to be left at the club house or could not be used at the
UGA's new site. R. 528.
22.

The moving expenses totaled $4,087.27, and are set forth on the statements

from Mesa Moving and Storage and Midwest Office. Trial exhibit 19. The cost of moving
the telephone system totaled $2,102.69, and is set forth within the statements from Western
Communications. Trial exhibit 19. The cost of printing new stationary, envelopes, cards and
other necessary items totaled $4,815.53, and is set forth in the statements from Production
Graphics. Trial exhibit 19. These costs total $11,005.49.
Summary of the Argument
1.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the untimely motion

for reconsideration. The motion was based upon two affirmative defenses that were not
raised in the original answer or in the first summary judgment proceeding that directly
addressed the issue of liability which was at the heart of these defenses.
2.

The promise to convey the building lot to the UGA was a major part of the

agreement between the parties.

It was supported by consideration and was not an

unenforceable gift of municipal property.
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3.

The City owned the building lot and had full power and authority to convey the

lot to the UGA. The Municipal Building Authority also had full power and authority to
convey the lot to the UGA, but this issue is irrelevant because it never owned the lot.
4.

North Salt Lake breached the contract by misrepresenting that it owned the

building lot when it did not own the lot, by not conveying the lot when the UGA stood ready
and willing to enter into a lease extension, by telling the UGA that it had to sign a lease
extension and then deal with the developer to obtain clear, fee title to the lot, and by evicting
the UGA when the UGA told it to perform its part of the contract and convey the lot.
5.

The UGA was released from its duty to enter into a 20 year lease extension

because of North Salt Lake's breach of the agreement.
6.

The First Addendum controlled the rent terms of the 20 year extension and the

Second Addendum was an unenforceable agreement to agree because it provided that the
City could charge whatever it wanted for rent during the extension.
7.

By awarding the UGA damages in the amount of the fair market value of the

building lot, the trial court put the parties in the same position as if the contract to convey fee
title in the lot had been fully performed. This was the correct measure of damages.
8.

The trial court erred in not awarding the UGA its costs of moving caused by

its wrongful eviction.
Argument
A.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Denying North Salt Lake's
Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 4, 2000, the UGA moved the trial court for summary judgment on liability
16

for breach of contract. R. 99. North Salt Lake opposed the motion. R. 164. The court
announced its decision on July 14, 2000, granting the motion for summary judgment on
liability. R. 220. The UGA certified the case for trial on October 4, 2000. R. 229. On
November 9, 2000, the court set cut off dates. R. 237. The cut off date for the witness list
and exhibit list for trial was January 5, 2001. Id. The cut off date for depositions was
January 31, 2001. W.
On January 17, 2001, North Salt Lake moved for reconsideration of the court's
decision on summary judgment on liability. R. 253. This was six months after the initial
decision on liability, and the motion was filed after the witness list and exhibit list for the
trial were exchanged and only two weeks before the deposition cut off.
The motion for reconsideration raised two new issues: 1) the lease was ultra vires and
not enforceable; and 2) the accompanying affidavit of the developer indicated that she would
have conveyed fee title to the UGA Property if the City would have only asked, which meant
that the City could have performed and conveyed fee title at the time the UGA signed a 20
year lease extension. R. 253. Both of these defenses were affirmative defenses to liability
that should have been raised six months earlier at the time of the initial summary judgment
proceeding on liability. North Salt Lake chose to not raise them at the earlier date.
The new witness, the developer, had no relevant evidence to add to the court's
decision on liability. She was not even on the City's witness list for trial. R. 241. Her
affidavit simply states that she would have conveyed fee title to the UGA Property to the City
if it would have simply asked. R. 320. However, the affidavit did not change the fact that:
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1) North Salt Lake represented that it held fee title in the UGA property in the written
documents, which representation was false, R. 27; 2) the primary inducement to the UGA to
leave its corporate offices and relocate to the City's Eaglewood golf course was the promise
of fee title in the Property, R. 27 & 527; 3) prior to expiration of the initial term of the lease,
the parties discovered that North Salt Lake did not have fee title in the UGA Property, R.
527; 4) Between March, 1999, and December, 1999, the parties attempted to negotiate a
resolution to the problem, R. 527 and letters between the parties, trial exhibits 7 - 14; 5)
North Salt Lake did not obtain fee title in the Property, R. 528, and Special Warranty Deed
from the developer, R. 140; 6) the City took the position that it would not meet its contractual
obligation and obtain fee title for the UGA and it was the UGA's responsibility to go to the
developer and obtain fee title, Transcript of trial testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake
Director of Golf and Recreation, p. 94, R. 565; and testimony of Colin Wood, North Salt
Lake City Manager, p. 131, R. 565; 7) the UGA stood ready and willing to sign a 20 year
lease extension R.528, and UGA letter of December 8,1999, trial exhibit 13; and 8) the City
evicted the UGA when the UGA continued to demand that the City perform its contractual
obligation and convey fee title to the UGA Property, R. 528 and eviction notice, trial exhibit
15.2
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider a summary judgment
2

The affidavit is suspect. Why would the developer change her mind and state
that she would have conveyed the UGA Property in fee, without use restrictions, when
she conveyed it to the City in 1997 with carefully worded use restrictions that prevented
the UGA from reselling the property? The UGA has since been evicted and cannot take
advantage of the developer's change of heart. Further, the developer has not lifted the
deed restrictions and they exist today. She only states that she would have.
18

is within the discretion of the trial court, and this court will not disturb the decision absent
an abuse of discretion. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381,1386 & 87 (Utah 1996). The trial
court determined that North Salt Lake's new legal arguments were affirmative defenses to
the original summary judgment and could have and should have been raised at that time. R.
423 & 24. The court also agreed with the UGA that the affidavit of the developer should be
stricken. R. 422. The fact raised by the developer in her affidavit that she would have
released the deed restrictions if the City had only asked did not change the fact that North
Salt Lake made no effort to obtain such a release, told the UGA that it had to deal with the
developer and then evicted the UGA when the City could not provide fee title. Further, the
affidavit does not address the fact that the lot was short 1,207 square feet from the lot agreed
to be conveyed. The developer's affidavit was something that could have been obtained for
the first summary judgment six months earlier, and its content was irrelevant.
The court should sustain the trial court's decision to not reconsider the summary
judgment based upon the arguments that the lease was ultra vires and that the developer
would have lifted the deed restrictions. The trial court also ruled that these arguments failed
on the merits. R. 424 & 25. If this court decides to consider these issues on the merits, the
UGA has briefed them below.
B.

North Salt Lake and the Municipal Building Authority Waived the Defenses that
the Agreement was Ultra Vires and that the Developer would Convey Fee Title
to the UGA Property.
North Salt Lake and the Municipal Building Authority answered the complaint on

February 29, 2000, but did not raise the two legal issues that they presented in their motion
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for reconsideration as affirmative defenses under Rules 12(b) and 8(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) provides that any defense shall be asserted in a responsive
pleading.

Rule 8(c) provides that a responsive pleading must set forth any matter

"constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." The defenses that the agreement was
ultra vires and that the developer would have conveyed the UGA Property free of the use
restrictions were clearly "affirmative defenses" and an "avoidance" because they deny
liability not because the allegations of the complaint are not true, but because the legislature
and the Utah Constitution are alleged to have prohibited such contracts as ultra vires and
because the developer is claimed to have stood ready to convey fee title to North Salt Lake.
Therefore, to preserve these defenses, they had to be raised in the defendants' answer.
Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1990). They were not
raised as affirmative defenses and the UGA objected to North Salt Lake raising them in its
motion for reconsideration. The UGA also moved to have them and the affidavit of the
developer stricken.
Not only were they not raised as affirmative defenses, the defendants affirmatively
alleged in their Answer that their execution of the documents was "taken under proper
authority of law." Answer, Third Defense, R. 95. The defendants clearly waived their right
to assert the ultra vires argument by not raising it as an affirmative defense and also by
expressly disclaiming the defense in the Answer.
C.

The Agreement Requiring North Salt Lake and its Municipal Building Authority
to Convey the Building Lot was not an Unenforceable Gift.
North Salt Lake argues that the agreement to convey the fee title in the UGA Property,
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the building lot, was a gift, and therefore an unenforceable ultra vires agreement. The
conveyance of fee title was not a gift. It was, rather, part of a lease with the UGA, which is
the oldest and largest organization of amateur golfers in the state of Utah and Utah's
representative with the United States Golf Association, the governing body of the sport.
This agreement is a complete package and cannot be divided into parts. North Salt
Lake, however, argues that it should be divided into two parts that are distinct from each
other and designed to exist on their own. North Salt Lake argues that the first portion is the
lease of the UGA office space and the second portion is the agreement to convey the building
lot, which North Salt Lake calls a "gift."
The Office Use Agreement and the First Addendum were signed at the same time,
March of 1992, before the club house was constructed. The basic purpose of the Agreement
was lease of office space to the UGA for five years with payment of $30,300.00 annual rent.
R. 11 & 12. To induce the UGA to leave its current offices and move its operations to North
Salt Lake's Eaglewood club house, the City also agreed:
1.

To lease an additional 888 square feet at no cost to house the Utah Golf Hall

ofFame(R.27);
2.

To allow the UGA to hold two weekday tournaments each year and not charge

greens fees or cart fees for the tournaments (R. 27);
3.

To allow the UGA to use the driving range without charge for two hours per

week to train junior golfers (R. 27); and
4.

To convey fee title in an adjacent 18,975 square foot building lot to the UGA
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that was expressly designated in the documents as the "UGA Property" (R. 27 & 28).3
North Salt Lake now designates these items as "freebies" in its brief. However, they
were never called "freebies" by the parties in the documents or in their testimony. They were
an integral part of the Agreement, without which the UGA would not have relocated or
agreed to pay rent to North Salt Lake.
If North Salt Lake can convince the Court that these items were not part of the lease,
but were "freebies", then it hopes that such "freebies" will be ultra vires under Article VI,
§ 29 of the Utah Constitution and the cases of Sears v. Ogden City, 553 P.2d 118 (Utah
1975); Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v. Lowder. 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985);
and Salt Lake County Commission v. Short, 985 P.2d 899 (Utah 1999). However, each of
these cases dealt with actual gifts of municipal assets. The Sears case involved the gift of
city land to the local school district. The Lowder case addressed the gift of a county jail.
The Short case concerned cash contributions to charities. None of these cases involved the
bargained for exchange of property and lease of office space for the agreement to relocate
an organization's operations and the payment of $25,000.00 per year in rent.
1.

Public Policy requires that North Salt Lake not be allowed to escape its
obligation to honor the agreement with the UGA.

The contract that is at issue is a detailed written agreement that was negotiated

3

The Second Addendum to Office Use Agreement was signed two years later, after the
club house was built. R. 31. Since the final design of the club house was changed during the
construction, the amount of space leased by the UGA was reduced slightly and the rent was
reduced to $25,000.00 per year. R. 31 & 32. The Second Addendum also allowed the City to
share in any income from the UGA's two annual tournaments and driving range use. R. 33. The
Second Addendum retained the duty to convey the UGA Property to the UGA, but changed the
agreement concerning the amount of rent for future extensions of the lease. R. 34.
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between North Salt Lake and the UGA over several months. Both of the parties were happy
with its terms. Thus, they signed it. After five years of both party's performance under the
contract, North Salt Lake discovered that it did not own fee title to the UGA Property and
could not perform its agreement to convey such fee title. It started looking for ways to
escape its obligations under the agreement. See affidavit of North Salt Lake Mayor James
W. Dixon, para. 8 & 9, R. 161. North Salt Lake also discovered that it could obtain higher
rent than the rent that the UGA was obligated to pay. See p. 23, note 2 of North Salt Lake
brief. North Salt Lake breached the agreement by refusing to convey the UGA Property,
evicted the UGA and rented the office space to third parties for increased rent. North Salt
Lake now attacks the contract as ultra vires and asks this Court to absolve it of liability for
its breach of the lease.
In each of the three cases cited by North Salt Lake, the government parties to the
contracts or gifts supported the contracts or gifts. In the Sears case, Ogden City favored the
gift of the real property to the school district. Sears v. Ogden City, 553 P.2d at 118.
Likewise, in the Lowder case, the Iron County Municipal Building Authority sought a
declaratory judgment to validate the transaction that included a gift of the old county jail.
Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v. Lowder. 711 P.2d at 275. In Short, the
charitable contributions were supported by the Salt Lake County Commission who made the
contributions. Salt Lake County Commission v. Short. 985 P.2d at 900. In each case, the
gifts were challenged by third parties to the gifts or contracts.
In the present case, the lease is not being challenged by third parties. It is being
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attacked by North Salt Lake, the party who misrepresented its ownership in the UGA
Property, the party who could not perform under the lease because it did not own fee title in
the Property, and the party who wanted to evict the UGA so that it could rent the office space
for more than the UGA was obligated to pay.
This Court recently addressed an arm's length transaction between a state agency and
a private company where the state agency, not a third party, attacked the contract and
attempted to use Article VI, § 29 of the Utah Constitution to disavow the agreement and its
duty to pay the private company. Health Services Group, Inc. v. Utah Department of Health.
40 P.3d 591 (Utah 2002). The state agency failed. Id. at 599. The Court upheld the contract
and the obligation of the state agency to perform under the contract. Id.
The Court should, likewise, deny North Salt Lake's attempt to back out of its
agreement with the UGA. To allow North Salt Lake to walk from its obligations under the
agreement would set a precedent that a contract with a municipality can be ignored if the
municipality subsequently changes its mind and does not like the terms of the contract.
2.

There was consideration to support the Agreement.

North Salt Lake argues that there was no consideration for the agreement to convey
the UGA Property. In support of this argument, it reasons that the $150,000.00 in rent that
the UGA paid over the six years that it occupied the club house was only consideration for
the lease of the office space. The UGA would have paid an additional $640,000.00 in rent
over the extended 20 year life of the lease if North Salt Lake would not have breached the
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lease and evicted the UGA. 4
North Salt Lake ignores the fact that the contract is one agreement. The parties
recognized in the body of the agreement that it was a tremendous undertaking for the UGA
to leave its offices in Salt Lake City and move its operations to North Salt Lake. The First
and Second Addendums to the Office Use Agreement clearly state in several paragraphs that
North Salt Lake agreed to a number of inducements to convince the UGA to go to the effort
and expense of moving its operations. R. 27 & 32. Some inducements were minor, such as
the right to use the driving range for two hours per week for a junior golf program. One
inducement, the obligation of North Salt Lake to convey fee title in the UGA Property, was
major and without it the UGA would not have entered into the lease.
In order for a transfer of municipal property to meet the requirements of Article VI,
Section 29 of the Utah Constitution, the transfer must be "in good faith and for adequate
consideration." Sears v. Ogden City, 553 P.2d at 119; Municipal Building Authority of Iron
County v. Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282; and Salt Lake County Commission v. Short, 985 P.2d
at 909. The UGA lease was negotiated over several months. There is no evidence that it was
not in good faith.

4

North Salt Lake points out that after it decided to evict the UGA, it was able to lease the
office space for more than the UGA was paying. This argument demonstrates the little
importance that North Salt Lake places on written contracts. North Salt Lake misrepresented in
the written documents that it owned fee title in the UGA lot. It could not convey the lot when the
UGA stood ready to enter into a lease extension. North Salt Lake resolved this problem by
evicting the UGA. North Salt Lake then rented the office space for more than the UGA was
paying and now argues that this was evidence that the UGA paid no consideration for the
conveyance of the UGA lot. This is evidence of how little the written contract meant to North
Salt Lake.
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North Salt Lake admits that there was consideration for the lease, but takes the
position that these cases require something more than the consideration that would support
contracts between private parties. These cases do not support this position. The reason that
the charitable gifts were rejected in Short was that they were outright gifts. Salt Lake County
argued that the charitable organizations benefited the County. Salt Lake County Commission
v. Short, 985 P.2d at 910. This Court held that the benefits were too speculative to support
the gifts and that the benefits must be specifically identified. Id. The reason that the gift of
the land failed in Sears was because the gift was simply that, a gift, with no evidence of
specific benefits flowing from the gift. The reason that the gift of the county jail failed in
Lowder was that it was an outright gift given the fact that the County's right to reacquire the
jail was 20 years down the road and there was a good chance that the right would not exist
at that point in time under the terms of the contract. Municipal Building Authority of Iron
County v. Lowder. 711 P.2dat282.
This Court considered the level of consideration necessary to support a contract with
a government agency in Healthcare Services Group, Inc. and determined that there is no
higher threshold of consideration in a contract with the government than there is in contracts
between private entities. Health Services Group, Inc. v. Utah Department of Health, 40 P. 3d
at 596. The Court stated:
"Consideration is present when there is an act or promise given in exchange
for the other party's promise. Thus, there is consideration whenever a promisor
receives a benefit or where a promisee suffers a detriment, however slight."
[Citations omitted.]
Id.
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The detriment suffered by the UGA and the benefit received by North Salt Lake were
not "slight." North Salt Lake obtained a tenant of good reputation in the golfing community,
was paid $150,000.00 over six years and would have been paid another $640,000.00 for a
20 year extension of the lease, had it not decided to solve its problem with the UGA Property
by evicting the UGA. The UGA suffered the detriment of moving its operations to the
Eaglewood club house, paying $150,000.00 over six years, losing the contracted UGA
Property, losing what North Salt Lake claims was a below market lease, and then being
forced to move its operations a second time when it was evicted.
D.

The Conveyance of the UGA Property was not Ultra Vires.
North Salt Lake argues that the agreement was ultra vires because the Building

Authority did not have the power to convey the UGA Property under the Utah Municipal
Building Authority Act, Title, 17A, Chapter 3, or the Utah Code.
1.

The City owned the UGA Property and had full power and authority to
convey the property.

The Building Authority never owned the UGA Property and North Salt Lake never
believed that the property would be owned by the Building Authority. North Salt Lake's
Mayor attested that he believed that the property was owned by the City at the time the
Agreement with the UGA was executed. R. 161. Several years later, it was discovered that
the property had not been deeded to the City and a Special Warranty Deed was obtained from
the developer conveying the property to the City, not to the Building Authority. R. 161 and
Special Warranty Deed, R. 140. The City, not the Building Authority, has continued to own
the lot.
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During the year's negotiations that took place between the City and the UGA whereby
the parties sought a means to solve the problem caused by the use restrictions that the
developer wrote into the Special Warranty Deed, the City never once claimed the Municipal
Building Authority owned the property and its conveyance would be ultra vires to the powers
of the Building Authority. See April 28, 1999 letter of North Salt Lake City Attorney; "the
City's obligation to convey the property to the UGA;" and "the City shall transfer all right,
title and interest the City owns in the property to the UGA". R. 145 and Exhibit 7, trial
exhibits. See September 8, 1999 letter of City Attorney acknowledging the interest of the
UGA in the building lot and the City's duty to reacquire the lot. Exhibit 8, trial exhibits.
Even after being sued, the defendants affirmatively alleged that they had full authority under
the law to enter into the obligations within the agreement. North Salt Lake Answer, Third
Defense, R. 95.
North Salt Lake never intended that the UGA Property would be part of the golf
course project that was the purpose of North Salt Lake's Municipal Building Authority. The
City received the Special Warranty Deed in September, 1997. The sole purpose of the UGA
Property was to fulfill the duty of North Salt Lake to convey the lot to the UGA in order to
meet its contractual obligations under the Agreement. The golf course had been funded,
designed, constructed, planted and was "growing in" in 1993, four years before the UGA
Property was deeded to the City. Testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake's Director of
Golf, transcript of trial, at 74. R. 565.
The first time that the City raised the argument that the Building Authority, rather than

28

North Salt Lake, owned the UGA Property was shortly before trial when the City asked the
trial court to reconsider its prior summary judgment on liability that had been granted six
months earlier.
2.

Both the City and the Municipal Building Authority had the power to
convey the building lot to the UGA.

The City had the power to contract and the power to purchase, hold and dispose of real
property. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-1-202 and 10-8-2. The Building Authority had the
authority to acquire and hold property by any lawful means, including by "exchange," by
"purchase," by "sale," and by "lease." Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-902(l). If the UGA
Property was part of the Municipal Building Authority project, both the City and the
Municipal Building Authority had the express authority to enter into a lease agreement with
the UGA that resulted in the rental of office space at the club house. This express authority
included the "sale" or conveyance of the building lot as an integral part of the lease.
The Building Authority also had the express authority to take actions to "acquire,"
"improve," and "extend" the project. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17A-3-902(3) & 17A-3-903(l).
Improving and extending a project may require the conveyance of certain portions of the
project and acquisition of other areas of property in order to meet the shape, design, and
purpose of the project. Improving a project could require the promise of a building lot to a
recognized golf association in order to induce the association to incur the cost and effort to
move its operations to the City's golf course.
The authority of the Building Authority also included the implied authority to take the
necessary actions and enter into the necessary agreements to complete and operate the
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Building Authority project. Nothing in the Municipal Building Authority Act proscribed the
Building Authority from making the promises that it made to the UGA. Indeed the Building
Authority was a nonprofit corporation.

Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-903.

Nonprofit

corporations have the express authority to contract and acquire, hold and convey real
property. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-302.
Both the express and implied authority of the Building Authority must be read in light
of the Legislature's directive that the Municipal Building Authority Act is "supplemental to
all existing laws relating to the acquisition, use, maintenance, or operation of projects by
public bodies," including the authority of the City to execute the Agreement with the UGA
and its duty to convey fee title in the UGA Property. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914. The
Legislature also recognized that the Act had to be "liberally construed" so that the Building
Authority and the City could develop the projects authorized by the Act. Utah Code Ann.
§ 17A-3-917.
E.

North Salt Lake Breached the Agreement.
The First Addendum gave the UGA two choices concerning the UGA property. The

UGA could either elect to build its offices on the property or it could elect to not construct
its offices on the property. First Addendum, para.4 & 5; R. 28. If it chose to build its offices,
it had to give written notice of that election to North Salt Lake and provide copies of the
plans for the offices. First Addendum, para.4. If North Salt Lake approved the plans, the
building lot had to be conveyed to the UGA. Id.
If the UGA chose to not build its offices on the UGA property, then it had to enter into
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a 20 year extension of the lease of its present office space at the same base rent with an
annual cost of living increase of 3% per year. First Addendum, para. 5. If the 20 year
extension was entered into, fee title in the lot had to be conveyed to the UGA. Id.
As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties started negotiations for a long
term lease. Findings of Fact; R. 527. The UGA desired to exercise its rights under the First
Addendum and enter into a 20 year extension. Id. During the negotiations, it became clear
that North Salt Lake did not hold title to the subject lot that would make it marketable to third
parties because of the use restrictions in the deed to North Salt Lake from the original
developer. Id. The UGA required the City to obtain release of the use restrictions and stand
ready to deed "fee title" in a lot of 18,975 square feet, not 17,768 square feet, that could be
marketable to third parties. Id.
Between March, 1999, and December, 1999, the parties tried to resolve the problem
caused by North Salt Lake's inability to convey such a lot. Findings of Fact; R. 527. North
Salt Lake did not obtain release of the use restrictions. Findings of Fact; R. 528. The initial
lease expired and the UGA became a month-to-month tenant. Id. The UGA continued to
require North Salt Lake to be able to convey fee title, free and clear from the use restrictions
before entering into a new lease. Id- North Salt Lake took the position that the UGA should
sign a 20 year extension of the lease, not receive the fee title in the lot, and then take it on
itself to go to the developer and negotiate the fee title that North Salt Lake was obligated to
provide. Transcript of trial testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake Director of Golf and
Recreation, p. 94, R. 565; and testimony of Colin Wood, North Salt Lake City Manager, p.
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131, R. 565.
The trial court found that but for the inability of North Salt Lake to convey fee title
of an 18, 975 square foot lot, free and clear from the use restrictions, a 20 year extension to
the lease would have been negotiated. Findings of Fact; R. 528. The UGA stood ready to
perform its part of the Agreement and enter into a 20 year extension. The UGA's letter of
December 8, 1999 made that fact clear. R. 148. All that the UGA required was that North
Salt Lake perform its part of the agreement by conveying fee title in the lot in return for the
20 year extension. North Salt Lake simply refused to meet its part of the agreement and
convey fee title. It could not do so. It did not own fee title. North Salt Lake ignored its
obligations under the Agreement and told the UGA that it had to approach the developer and
clear up the problem and negotiate fee title to the lot. The City solved the problem by
terminating the tenancy and evicting the UGA.
This was a clear breach of the agreement. It was time to perform and the City refused
to do so. The trial court called the breach an anticipatory breach which excused the UGA's
performance of entering into a 20 year extension of the lease. R. 222. An anticipatory
breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests a positive and unequivocal
intent to not render its promised performance when the time arrives to perform. Hurwitz v.
DavidK. Richards Co., 436, P.2d 794,796 (Utah 1968); and Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe.
799 P.2d 716, 724 (Utah Ct. of App. 1990). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
253 (1977).
Upon the City's breach, the UGA had three options: 1) treat the entire contract as
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broken and sue for damages; 2) treat the contract as still binding and wait until the time
arrived for its performance and at such time bring an action on the contract; 3) Rescind the
contract and sue for money paid or for the value of the services or property furnished.
Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co., 436, P.2d at 796; and Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe.
799 P.2d at 724, n. 4. The UGA chose the first remedy, treated the contract as broken and
sued for the damages of the lost market value of the lot and its costs of moving. The trial
court awarded the market value of the lot, but denied the costs of moving.
1.

The time arrived for North Salt Lake to perform and stand ready to
convey fee title, which North Salt Lake could not do.

The UGA does not argue with the doctrine that a seller of real property has a duty to
convey title at the time conveyance is required under the contract. Neves v. Wright, 63 8 P.2d
1195, 1198 (Utah 1981). However, North Salt Lake's argument that this doctrine absolves
it from liability misses one small part of the doctrine. The time had arrived to convey the lot.
The UGA stood ready to enter into a 20 year extension of the lease. R. 527 & 528 and UGA
letter of December 3,1999, trial exhibit 13. North Salt Lake could not perform its part of the
agreement and convey fee title in the UGA property because it never owned such fee title
even though it represented in the documents that it did. R. 527 & 528, and Special Warranty
Deed to North Salt Lake from developer, R. 140. Further, the City made no effort to obtain
fee title. The UGA told North Salt Lake on numerous occasions that it had to be able to
convey fee title, free and clear from the use restrictions before the UGA would enter into a
new lease. R. 527 & 528 and letters exchanged between North Salt Lake and the UGA, trial
exhibits 7-14. North Salt Lake simply refused to solve the problem and go to the developer
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and obtain fee title in a 18,975 square foot lot. Instead, the City took the position that the
UGA should sign a 20 year lease, not receive the fee title in the lot, and then take it upon
itself to go to the developer and negotiate the fee title that North Salt Lake could not provide
and would not obtain. Transcript of trial testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake
Director of Golf and Recreation, p. 94, R. 565; and testimony of Colin Wood, North Salt
Lake City Manager, p. 131, R. 565.
The trial court found that but for the inability of North Salt Lake to convey fee title,
free and clear from the use restrictions, a 20 year lease would have been negotiated. Findings
of Fact; R. 528. In order to resolve the problem, North Salt Lake terminated the tenancy of
the UGA and evicted the UGA from its offices on December 31, 1999. Id. Over one year
after North Salt Lake evicted the UGA, the City obtained an affidavit from the developer that
attested that she would have removed the use restrictions if the City had simply asked.
R.320. This affidavit was suspect and late, and was stricken by the court.5 It was obtained
by the City in an attempt to convince the trial court to change its decision of six months
earlier that the City had breached the Agreement by not being able to convey fee title in the
UGA Property. At that time, the UGA had already been evicted and this lawsuit was about
to go to trial on the issue of damages.
2.

The anticipatory breach of the Agreement by North Salt Lake relieved the
UGA of the requirement of a 20 year lease extension.

North Salt Lake argues that the UGA had to agree to a 20 year lease on rent terms

5

The court should note that the developer never released the deed restrictions. They exist
today. The developer only said that she would.
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acceptable to North Salt Lake before it had a duty to convey the UGA Property. North Salt
Lake reasons that the UGA had to negotiate with the developer to obtain the UGA Property
free and clear of the use restrictions even though the City was obligated to convey fee title
to the Property. Transcript of trial testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake Director of
Golf and Recreation, p. 94, R. 565; and testimony of Colin Wood, North Salt Lake City
Manager, p. 131, R. 565. When the UGA refused to accept such a lease, North Salt Lake
evicted the UGA.
The trial court recognized that North Salt Lake's argument was simply an escape route
designed to absolve it from its breach of the Agreement. The trial court reasoned that under
certain conditions, an anticipatory breach of a contract excuses the other party from
performing conditions precedent, such as entering into a 20 year lease. R. 222. The trial
court construed the Agreement to be that North Salt Lake promised unrestricted fee title to
an 18,975 square foot lot. R. 222 & 23. North Salt Lake had plenty of opportunity to
provide such title, but could not. Id. The UGA demanded such title and stood ready to enter
into a 20 year lease. Id. North Salt Lake refused to convey fee title to such a lot because it
did not have such title and eventually solved the problem by evicting the UGA. The court
concluded that this was an anticipatory breach of the Agreement. Id.
An anticipatory breach will generally excuse the nonoccurrence of a condition
precedent. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 245 & 255 (1977); J. Murray, Murray on
Contracts § 188, p. 366-67; "[i]f, when the time for the happening of a condition precedent
arrives, it appears that the promise that is qualified by the condition cannot be performed by
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the promisor, the general rule is that the condition is excused . . . If it is reasonably certain
that the promisee will not receive that which is the contemplated exchange for the
performance of the condition, there is every reason why he should not be required to perform
the condition as a preliminary to the recovery of compensation for defeated expectations ..
." Since the UGA stood ready and willing to enter into a 20 year lease extension, and since
North Salt Lake refused to enter into the lease and thereafter evicted the UGA, the fact that
the lease extension was not agreed to does not act as a condition precedent barring the UGA
from seeking damages for its loss of the UGA Property. R. 223 & 24.
3,

The Second Addendum was an unenforceable agreement to agree.

Even if a 20 year extension of the lease had to be in place before North Salt Lake had
a duty to convey the lot, the terms of the 20 year extension would have been governed by the
First Addendum which set out the exact amount of rent that was to be paid during the 20
years. R.28. The second addendum, which allowed North Salt Lake to dictate the critical
term of the amount of the monthly rent, was an unenforceable agreement to agree. Pingree
v. The Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317,1321 (Utah 1976): Cottonwood Mall
Co. v. Sine. 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988); and Browns Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch. 955 P.2d 357,
364 (Utah App. 1998).
North Salt Lake argues that since the 20 year lease was a condition precedent, the trial
court only needed to determine if the condition precedent had been met. North Salt Lake
reasons that the Pingree line of cases does not invalidate the Second Addendum because the
court did not need to fashion a lease agreement for the parties even though the critical terms
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of the lease agreement, such as the amount of rent, were missing from the Second
Addendum. North Salt Lake concludes that the terms of the 20 year lease were unimportant,
that the UGA simply had to enter into a lease on such terms that North Salt Lake dictated.
North Salt Lake supports this conclusion by several cases from other states that hold that a
clause requiring one party to be "satisfied" with a required condition precedent is enforceable
and not an illusory agreement to agree.6
The requirement of a 20 year extension in the Second Addendum was not a
"satisfaction" requirement. It required the UGA to agree to whatever rent that North Salt
Lake wanted to charge for the 20 year extension of the lease. This would have given North
Salt Lake the unilateral power to frustrate the UGA's right to the building lot by negotiating
an excessive rent and would have effectively terminated the lease. Courts will construe
contracts so that one party does not have such an unilateral right of termination. Resource
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc.. 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah
1985).
In addition, the "satisfaction" line of cases cited by North Salt Lake would require the
trial court to determine if the City was being reasonable in its determination of whether the
condition precedent had been met. This meant that the court would have to investigate
whether North Salt Lake was asking a reasonable rent for the 20 year extension of the lease.
In doing so, the trial court would run head on into the prohibition of the Pingree line of cases

6

These cases are Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958); Western Hills, Oregon, Ltd
v. Pfau, 508 P.2d 201 (Or. 1973); and Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 645 P. 2d
727 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
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and be required to determine the dollar amount of "reasonable rent." The Second Addendum
was simply an unenforceable agreement to agree.7
4.

The UGA timely elected a 20 year lease and was precluded from entering
into such a lease by the actions of North Salt Lake.

North Salt Lake argues that if the Second Addendum was not enforceable, the UGA
failed to strictly abide by the terms of the First Addendum by entering into a 20 year lease
extension at a set rate of rent before the original period of the Agreement expired. The City
reasons that it had no duty to convey the building lot until this election was made and the
UGA did not make the election before the original period of the lease expired. There are
several problems with this argument.
a.

The UGA elected the 20 year lease extension but was precluded
from completing the extension of the lease by the actions of North
Salt Lake.

Before the initial period of the lease expired, the parties discovered that North Salt
7

Since the Second Addendum was unenforceable, the court should fall back to the
First Addendum and use the set rent from that agreement in place of the unenforceable
term of the Second Addendum. Corbin discusses this doctrine that if a subsequent
contract is void, or voided, because of fraud, infancy, or other reasons making the
contract unenforceable, the prior agreement, that does not have the defect, becomes
enforceable. Corbin on Contracts, § 1293 (1999 Cum Supp.). See also 17 Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 513; Indiana Flooring Co. v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 20 F.2d 63, 65 (6th Cir.
1927); Timely Products. Inc. v. Costanzo. 465 F.Supp. 91, 98 (D.Conn. 1979); Spellman
v. Ruhde, 137 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Wis. 1965); and Travelers Insurance Company v. Carey,
180 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Mich. Ct. of App. 1970).
This concept was discussed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Republic Group, Inc.
v. Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285, 291 & 293 (Utah App. 1994). In Won-Door. the
Court of Appeals replaced the unenforceable agreement with another agreement between
the parties that addressed the same subject since the other agreement was a valid and
enforceable contract.
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Lake could not perform the most important term of the 20 year extension and convey fee title
in the building lot. R. 527 and letters between the parties, trial exhibits 7 - 1 3 . Before the
expiration of the initial term of the lease, the UGA made it clear that it wanted the UGA
Property and was ready and willing to sign a 20 year extension. R. 527. Because of the
problem caused by North Salt Lake's inability to convey the fee title in the Property, the
parties entered into negotiations. R. 527. During these negotiations, the UGA advised North
Salt Lake that it stood willing and ready to sign a 20 year extension for the rent provided in
the First Addendum and that it expected the City to convey the building lot. R. 527 and UGA
letter of December 8,1999, trial exhibit 13. North Salt Lake responded by evicting the UGA.
R. 528 and eviction notice, trial exhibit 15.
b.

The anticipatory breach of North Salt Lake precluded the need of
the UGA to execute such an extension.

The argument that North Salt Lake did not need to convey the UGA Property because
the UGA did not execute a twenty year extension ignores the fact that an important part of
the consideration for the twenty year lease was the right to the UGA Property. The UGA was
absolved from entering into the lease because of the anticipatory breach of North Salt Lake,
as argued above.
c.

North Salt Lake's argument was raised for the first time on appeal.

The argument that the UGA did not execute a 20 year lease extension within the time
requirements of the agreement is raised for the first time on appeal. North Salt Lake is
precluded from making this argument. State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Utah 1992);
and State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1948, 1052-53 (Utah 1991).
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F.

The Trial Court did not Err in its Calculation of Damages.
The trial court awarded the UGA the value of the UGA Property that was lost when

North Salt Lake could not convey fee title in the Property. This value was $158,441.00.
North Salt Lake argues that the court should have deducted the present value of the 20 years
of lease payments that the UGA did not pay to North Salt Lake.
The UGA had the right to a 20 year lease at the rent set in the First Addendum and the
right to the UGA building lot. North Salt Lake breached the Agreement by refusing to
convey fee title in the building lot, by refusing to enter into a 20 year extension of the lease
and by evicting the UGA. The UGA had the right to sue for loss of its expectation of
receiving the building lot. The measure of damages for this loss was the fair market value
of the lot. The UGA also had the right to sue for the loss of the 20 year extension. The
measure of damages for loss of the extension of the lease would have been the difference
between what the UGA had to pay for similar replacement offices and what it would have
paid North Salt Lake under the lease.
Contrary to the argument of North Salt Lake, the UGA did not receive a windfall by
the judgment. The UGA still had to pay rent for its corporate offices, albeit to another
landlord because North Salt Lake evicted the UGA. The UGA received the benefit of the
building lot only because the trial court awarded a judgment for the fair market value of the
lot. This was the very position for which the UGA contracted.
Contrary to the argument of North Salt Lake, it has not had to pay more than it
contracted to pay. It paid for the building lot, not by purchasing the lot and conveying it to
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the UGA under the contract, but by the judgment awarded against it. It has continued to
collect rent for the office space, not from the UGA because of the eviction, but from the other
tenants who have moved into the space. This was the very position for which North Salt
Lake contracted.8
Upon anticipatory breach, a party can treat the contract as broken and sue for
damages. Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co., 436 P.2d at 796. The proper measure of
damages for breach of contract is the amount necessary to place the nonbreaching party in
as good of a position as if the contract had been performed. Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933,
941 (Utah 1999); Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692,695 (Utah 1982); and Keller v. Deseret
Mortuary Co., 455 P. 2d 197, 198 (Utah 1969). The trial court's award of the $158,441.00
fair market value of the building lot should be upheld.
G.

The Trial Court Erred in Declining to Award the UGA its Costs of Moving After
being Evicted by North Salt Lake.
North Salt Lake evicted the UGA even though the UGA stood ready and willing to

sign a 20 year lease extension consistent with the terms of the First Addendum. North Salt
Lake evicted the UGA because the City could not perform its contractual duty and convey
the building lot and the UGA was demanding conveyance of the lot. The eviction breached
the UGA's right to a 20 year extension. When it was evicted, the UGA incurred costs and
expenses to move its offices. R. 528. These costs and expenses included moving expenses
of $4,087.27, as set forth on the statements from Mesa Moving and Storage and Midwest

8

Actually, North Salt Lake is in a better position because it leased the office space
to the tenants that replaced the UGA for a higher rate of rent.
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Office. Trial exhibit 19. They included the cost of moving the telephone system in the
amount of $2,102.69, which is set forth within the statements from Western
Communications. Trial exhibit 19. They also included the cost of printing new stationary,
envelopes, cards and other necessary items with a new address for the UGA for $4,815.53,
as set forth in the statements from Production Graphics. Trial exhibit 19.
These costs and expenses total $11,005.49 and would not have been incurred if the
UGA had been allowed to have the benefit of its right to the 20 year extension. In order to
put the UGA in the same position that it would have enjoyed had the contract been performed
by North Salt Lake, the trial court should have awarded these costs and expenses to the UGA.
Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d at 695. They were fully supported by testimony, canceled
checks and bills from the moving company, telephone company and printer. The existence
and amount of the damages were certain and not speculative. The trial court committed error
by not awarding these damages.9
The reason that the trial court did not award these damages is because it concluded
that the UGA had a duty to mitigate its damages by signing a 20 year lease extension without
the conveyance of the building lot and then suing North Salt Lake for the value of the lot.
R. 443-45. The trial court reached this conclusion even though it also concluded that the City
breached a very important obligation under the contract, its duty to convey the building lot.
9

The UGA also sought damages for the wages of its employees involved in the
moving of the offices and the value of improvements to the offices left behind. The trial
court concluded that these damages were speculative and uncertain. The UGA agrees
with this conclusion, but does not agree with the conclusion that it failed to mitigate its
damages, thus losing its hard costs of moving, such as the cost of the moving company,
the telephone company and the printer.
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The UGA had no duty to mitigate its damages by negotiating with the developer to
convey the building lot without the deed restrictions and by negotiating the additional 1,207
square feet that was never owned by the City. North Salt Lake agreed to convey clear, fee
title in an 18, 975 square foot lot, not a 17,768 square foot lot with restrictions that made it
impossible to resale the lot. North Salt Lake was fully aware of the consequences of its
actions caused by its failure to convey the lot and its eviction of the UGA. North Salt Lake
had the same opportunity as the UGA to mitigate the damages by negotiating with the
developer to obtain clear, fee title in the correct size of lot. North Salt Lake had the same
opportunity as the UGA to limit the damages by not evicting the UGA. Yet, the City chose
to not negotiate with the developer and chose to evict the UGA. These conscious choices
caused the damages of loss of the building lot and the expenses of moving the UGA's
offices.
Where the breaching party has the same opportunity to perform the contract and the
same knowledge of the consequences of nonperformance as the party to whom the
contractual duty is owed, the breaching party cannot complain about the failure of the latter
to perform his contractual duty. Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d at 695. The UGA had no
duty to mitigate the damages of the costs of moving its offices by signing a 20 year lease
without the bargained for benefit of clear, fee title in the building lot. The trial court's
decision to not award the UGA its $11,005.49 of moving costs was clear error and the court
should reverse this portion of the decision and award these costs, plus interest at the
prejudgment and postjudgment rates from the date of the eviction, December, 12, 1999.
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Further, mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense. John Call Engineering v.
Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1990). This defense was not pled in the
defendants' answer or raised by motion. The trial court based this portion of its decision on
an affirmative defense that was not pled by the defendants or reasonably anticipated by the
UGA. This defense should not have been considered. Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation,
Ca, 793 P.2d at 899.
H.

The Court Could Uphold the Decision of the Trial Court Based upon Breach of
the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

The UGA also alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
Complaint. The essence of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is that every party
must act reasonably, not arbitrarily, towards the other party to the contract so as not to
deprive the other party of the benefits of the contract. Resource Management Co. v. Weston
Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d at 1037; Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isorru 657
P.2d293, 311 (Utah 1982); and Ted R. Brown Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d964, 970
(Utah App. 1988).
North Salt Lake did not act reasonably towards the UGA. The right to the UGA
Property was clearly an important part of the agreement between the parties. North Salt Lake
represented that it owned the lot in fee title. It did not. When this fact was discovered, North
Salt Lake did not act reasonably. It should have obtained the lot from the developer and
conveyed the lot to the UGA or paid the fair market value of the lot to the UGA if the
developer refused to convey fee title to the lot. At the same time the parties should have
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agreed to the twenty year lease extension with the rent increases outlined in the First
Addendum. Instead, North Salt Lake refused to deal with the developer, told the UGA that
it had to solve the problem with the developer or take the building lot with the lesser square
footage and the use restrictions that gutted all of the value from the lot, or face being evicted.
When the UGA stood its ground and demanded that North Salt Lake honor its contractual
obligations and convey fee title in the lot, the City evicted the UGA. This was not reasonable
behavior and destroyed the UGA's right to the building lot and its right to a 20 year lease
extension. The court could uphold the decision of the trial court based upon the breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by North Salt Lake.
Conclusion
The Court should uphold the judgment of the trial court in the amount of the fair
market value of the building lot, $158,441.00; modify the judgment by awarding the UGA
its $11,005.49 in moving costs and expenses, plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest
from the date of the eviction, December 31, 1999; and remand the case to the trial court to
determine the attorney's fees, costs and litigation expenses incurred in this appeal (the
written agreements contain attorney fee provisions), which should be added to the judgment.
Dated the 19th day of June, 2002.
Hoole & King

Lester A. Perry
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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